Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2018

Algorithmic Opacity & Exclusion in Antitrust Law
Mark R. Patterson

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

ALGORITHMIC OPACITY AND EXCLUSION IN ANTITRUST LAW
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Abstract: Traditionally evidence of exclusion was
available to those injured by it. If a dominant firm
refused to deal with a competitor, perhaps denying an
important input, or priced predatorily, there was no
difficulty in presenting evidence of the conduct at issue.
As means of exclusion became subtler, such as with
rebate structures, the conduct was less public, but still
evidence was typically available. Rebate terms were often
incorporated in contracts, for example, and copies could
be obtained from customers. Exclusion by online
platforms is very different. When a competitor is injured
by, say, a disadvantageous position in search results, the
cause is often an algorithm whose function is entirely
internal to the dominant firm. In such instances, a
private plaintiff may not have access to evidence that
would allow it to allege satisfactorily, let alone prove, a
violation. This brief note sets out the difficulty this issue
poses for competition law.

one respect, though, the decisions are similar:
each relies on information that a private litigant
would be unable to obtain, at least without
some form of discovery or other access to
Google’s internal documents. Whether there is
exclusion, and whether it is anticompetitive, is
determined in large part by Google’s algorithms,
and private litigants do not have access to those
algorithms.2 That makes it more difficult for a
private litigant to pursue an exclusion case,
given that some facts regarding the nature of
exclusion are necessary to avoid dismissal of
such a case.
This phenomenon reflects an evolution of
exclusion cases from straightforward exclusion,
through unilateral refusals to deal, for example,
to less transparent techniques. One example
is that of “Contracts that Reference Rivals,”
as described some years ago by then-U.S.
Department of Justice Deputy Attorney General
Fiona Scott Morton.3 The terms of contracts
including most-favored-nation clauses or

That is not to say that there is no public information about
Google’s algorithms. In fact, the European Commission in
its decision cites a number of statements by Google
purporting to describe at least some aspects of the
algorithms. But it is unlikely that potential challengers will
find those disclosures adequate, or disinterested.
2

1. INTRODUCTION
The differences between the US and EU
Google search decisions are well-known. In
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Dep’t of Justice, Contracts that Reference Rivals,
Presentation at Georgetown University Law Center
Antitrust
Seminar
(Apr.
5,
2012),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/281965.
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complicated rebate structures may not be
available to potential challengers, though
knowledge of such contracts often enters the
markets. Algorithmic forms of discrimination
(procompetitive or anticompetitive) are even
more obscure, and the nature of such
algorithms is more closely guarded.

publicly available. Finally, the conclusion points
out that without some access to evidence at early
stages of litigation, the lack of transparency in
algorithmic decision-making may prevent what
would be viable antitrust cases.

This raises important issues not only for the
Google cases but more generally for other
cases that would rely on information about the
use of internal algorithmic processes to make
decisions that could have exclusionary effects. At
least to the extent that a jurisdiction’s antitrust
enforcement relies on private litigation, as the
US’s does and as Europe’s aims to,4 the public
unavailability of important evidence, and the
inability to obtain access to it, pose significant
obstacles to the achievement of that goal.

2. EVIDENCE IN THE GOOGLE CASES

This brief informal essay will present these issues
by, first, offering examples of the evidence relied
upon in the US and EU Google cases, pointing
out that the evidence would not have been
available to private parties. Second, the essay
will very briefly outline the rules that might
provide private antitrust plaintiffs access to
evidence in the US and EU; it is unclear to
what extent those rules would aid a plaintiff
that did not already have access to some
important evidence. Third, the essay will
discuss several types of evidence that a plaintiff
might propose to rely on but that would not be
See European Commission, Competition policy brief:
The Damages Directive – Towards more effective
enforcement of the EU competition rules, Issue 2015-1,
Jan. 2015,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/201
5/001_en.pdf.
4

In the public version of the European
Commission’s Google decision, the Commission
“explains” how Google’s algorithm disadvantages
its competitors:
“(352) Comparison shopping services are prone to being
demoted by the […] algorithm due to the characteristics
of those services.
(353) First, […] 381 […].382
(354) Second, […].
(355) Third, […] 383 […].”5
The redactions here demonstrate the sensitivity
of the relevant information.6 The case relies on
the fact that Google’s own shopping service is
not treated similarly, but there too it relies on
generally unavailable information, pointing to
internal Google emails.7

Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping), 27 June
2017, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/
dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf, 352-353.
5

Id. at 1 (“Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that
confidential information/personal data is not disclosed. Those parts
are shown as […] or replaced by a non-confidential summary, or
ranges, in square brackets.”).
6

7

Id. 381-382.
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It is true that the EC decision also pointed to
external data based on the Sistrix Visibility
Index that show the changes over time in
website visibility.8 Even there, though, the
Commission cites Google for the data.9
Moreover, although one could perhaps
compare the prominence of Google’s own
shipping service to those of its competitors
using the Sistrix data, doing so would not
explain the reasons for the differences, and it is
that information that would determine whether
any exclusion was procompetitive or
anticompetitive.
Although the US FTC closed its investigation
into Google’s search practices in 2013, it did so
with similar reliance on internal Google data:
“While Google’s prominent display of its own vertical
search results on its search results page had the effect in
some cases of pushing other results “below the fold,” the
evidence suggests that Google’s primary goal in
introducing this content was to quickly answer, and
better satisfy, its users’ search queries by providing
directly relevant information. For example,
contemporaneous evidence demonstrates that Google
would typically test, monitor, and carefully consider the
effect of introducing its vertical content on the quality of
its general search results, and would demote its own
content to a less prominent location when a higher
ranking adversely affected the user experience. Analyses
of “click through” data showing how consumers reacted
to the proprietary content displayed by Google also

suggest that users benefited from these changes to
Google’s search results”.10
The information relied upon by the US and EU
agencies was not publicly available. As a
result, in the absence of any means to get
access to such information, private litigants
would have been unable to establish a prima
facie case against Google, or to know
whether they would ultimately be able to do
so. The discovery process in the US could
provide an avenue to obtain such information,
but in the absence of the information it is not
clear that a plaintiff could avoid an early
dismissal of its case and gain the opportunity
for discovery.

3. ACCESS TO EVIDENCE OF
ALGORITHMIC EFFECTS
In the US, a private litigant’s access to
information is governed by rules of discovery.
In the federal antitrust context, those rules are
contained in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which can provide extensive access
to information in control of the defendant. As
a general matter, though, discovery is not
available until any motion for dismissal of a
case is resolved, even though the rules contain

Statement of the Federal Trade Commission
Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of
Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163, Jan. 3, 2013,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pu
blic_statements/statement-commission-regardinggoogles-searchpractices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf.
10

8

Id. 361-362.

Id. at 82 n. 399 (citing “Google submission […] and Google’s
reply to the Commission's request for information […].”).
9

DOI: 10.12870/iar-12870

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3400208

25

no automatic stay of discovery.11 Because
antitrust defendants will almost always file
motions to dismiss, the result is that the grant
of such a motion will likely eliminate the
plaintiff’s ability to obtain discovery.
In the EU, the rules for private plaintiffs’
access to evidence were recently changed by
the Damages Directive.12 Although the issue
will surely be clarified over time, the Directive
appears potentially to provide antitrust claimants
with fairly broad access to evidence:
Member States shall ensure that in proceedings
relating to an action for damages in the Union,
upon request of a claimant who has presented a
reasoned justification containing reasonably
available facts and evidence sufficient to
support the plausibility of its claim for
damages, national courts are able to order the
defendant or a third party to disclose relevant
evidence which lies in their control, subject to
the conditions set out in this Chapter.13

This is, at least, the general understanding, though
discovery before resolution of a motion to dismiss may
be allowed more often than is often thought. See Gideon
Mark, Federal Discovery Stays, 45 U. MICH. J. OF L.
REFORM 408-13 (2012).
11

Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain
rules governing actions for damages under national law
for infringements of the competition law provisions of
the Member States and of the European Union. See also
Anca D. Chirita, “The disclosure of evidence under the
‘Antitrust Damages’ Directive 2014/104/EU,” in EU
Competition and State Aid Rules: Public and Private
Enforcement (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2017) at 147173.
12

13

Directive 2014/104/EU, art. 5.1.

The requirement of a “reasoned justification”
and “plausibility” make it possible that a national
court would decline to order disclosure of
evidence, of course, especially because in the
absence of such disclosure, there may be “no
reasonably available facts and evidence.” But a
court might also decide, if not facts or evidence
are reasonably available, that disclosure is
necessary.
Moreover, it appears (at least to this outside
observer) that this provision appears to make
the grant of disclosure discretionary, even at
early states of litigation:
Member States shall ensure that national courts
limit the disclosure of evidence to that which is
proportionate. In determining whether any
disclosure requested by a party is proportionate,
national courts shall consider the legitimate
interests of all parties and third parties
concerned. They shall, in particular, consider:
i) the extent to which the claim or defence is
supported by available facts and evidence
justifying the request to disclose evidence;
ii) the scope and cost of disclosure, especially for
any third parties concerned, including preventing
non-specific searches for information which is
unlikely to be of relevance for the parties in the
procedure;
iii) whether the evidence the disclosure of which
is sought contains confidential information,
especially concerning any third parties, and what
arrangements are in place for protecting such
confidential information.14

14

Id., art. 5.3.
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Ultimately, then, the right of an antitrust
plaintiff to evidence that might be necessary to
establish a viable case is not clear. In the US,
the right to discovery is often unavailable to a
plaintiff that is not already able to support
allegations with some evidence, in order to
establish a plausible case.15 In Europe, the
Damages Directive may provide a claimant with
access to critical evidence, but the Directive
seems to require that a claim be “supported by
available facts and evidence justifying the
request to disclose evidence,” and it is not clear
how flexible national courts will be in
interpreting this requirement.

A monopolization case17 requires a showing of
monopoly power and exclusionary conduct.
The former element generally requires that the
plaintiff define a relevant market and demonstrate
that the defendant has a large share of that market.
The latter requires a showing of anticompetitive
effect and probably the absence of a legitimate
business purpose. On a motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff need only allege these elements, not
prove them, but several U.S. Supreme Court
cases have made the allegation requirement a
significant one.18 The paragraphs below discuss
some allegations that a plaintiff might make
that would likely require evidence that is not
publicly available.
4.1 The Relevant Market

4. MAKING THE EXCLUSION CASE
Suppose that a website that has seen a change
in its positioning in Google’s organic results, or
in the amount that it must pay for placement in
AdWords displays, believes that the change is
anticompetitive. What evidence is available to
the website, and under what circumstances will
it be able to get disclosures from Google? I will
assume here that there has been no public
enforcement effort, so that the website cannot
rely on any rules that would allow it access to
information from public enforcers. I will also
focus on the United States, because that is
where these issues so far have played out.16

Although there is increasing skepticism about the
market-definition inquiry,19 unilateral-conduct
cases still generally require it. The skepticism does
suggest, though, that we should be open to
circumstances that do not fit the archetypal
model for the use of market definition and
market share. Information platforms certainly are
among such circumstances, as I have argued

typically dismissed on one of the grounds discussed in
the text.
Because I am focusing on the U.S., I also focus on
Sherman Act § 2, though abuse of dominance under
article 102 TFEU is similar.
17

See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007); Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U. S. 398 (2004).
18

See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
15

There were a number of cases brought against Google
for search bias in the decade of the 2000s, and they were
16

Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124
Harv. L. Rev. 437 (2010)
19
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elsewhere.20 Although the argument cannot be
rehearsed here, the basic point is that providers
of information can easily deliever additional
copies of it, so that the capacity limitations that
underlie reliance on market share as a proxy for
power are not applicable to information.
The limitations that do create power for
information providers are those that affect the
ability of competitors to reach consumers at
the times they are making use of information
and persuade the consumers of the value of the
information they are providing. It is more
difficult for an information provider to
demonstrate that its information is more useful
or accurate than that provided by a competitor
than it is for a seller to demonstrate that its
prices are lower.21 As a result, the nature of any
market definition inquiry is not straightforward,
and likely requires evidence of the credulity of
consumers and the time available to them to
search for and compare information. An
information platform like Google or Facebook
will often have useful evidence on these points
for their users, but that information will be less
available to outsiders.
These issues are also likely to be consumerspecific, depending as they do on the particular
characteristics of individual consumers. For
that reason, there are likely to be submarkets of

Mark R. Patterson, Antitrust Law in the New Economy:
Google, Yelp, LIBOR, and the Control of Information 61-84
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017).

consumers that share particular characteristics
with respect to the consumption of information.
Again, the information that would be needed to
identify and allege such submarkets will be in the
possession of information platforms but will
not be available publicly, though perhaps
consumer surveys could produce some such
information. Whether courts would accept
surveys as sufficient to establish a right to
further evidence is far from clear.
4.2 Anticompetitive Exclusion
Proving or alleging anticompetitive effect raises
some of the same issues as does market
definition. Here, though, the focus is on (a)
how competing information providers are
excluded, and (b) the significance of that
exclusion. Again, both factors are in the control
of the defendant. The first is the one referred
to in the quotation from the EC Google case
above,22 where the Commission redacted the
ways in which the competitors were excluded.
The second turns primarily on the effectiveness
and volume of exclusion, because those are the
factors that determine the degree to which
competitors are disadvantaged.23 Thus, in the
EC Google case, the relevant evidence would
be the nature of the algorithmic demoting of
competing providers and the scope of that

20

That may not be true where competing price
structures are complicated, as with some cellphone plans,
particularly in the US. There, too, though, the problem is
an informational one.
21

22

See supra text accompanying note 5.

“[T]he plaintiff must define the relevant market and
provide the degree of foreclosure.” United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc).
23
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demotion, both of which would be in the
possession of the defendant.24
4.3 Legitimate Business Purpose
Some exclusion is procompetitive. To the
extent that a provider is injured because its
competitor provides better service, antitrust
law would not intervene. But whether a
competitor in fact has acted with the goal of
providing better service will not be publicly
known. The quotation above from the FTC’s
statement regarding its Google investigation
points to exactly this sort of evidence,25 but it
would not have been available in any useful
way to private plaintiffs. Intent is not
dispositive, but it is relevant, and in markets for
information, where competitive effects are
uncertain, it will probably be especially
important. Here, too, then a plaintiff will be at
a disadvantage with respect to the defendant.

been that Google’s search results are “opinions”
protected under the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. I have addressed this issue
elsewhere.27 For present purposes it is sufficient
to note that there are difficult questions
regarding the distinction between facts and
opinions and regarding whether opinions imply
assertions of fact. I have argued, with judicial
support, that these issues require an analysis
similar to that for assessing whether the
speaker had a legitimate purpose.28 Therefore, a
plaintiff seeking to overcome a motion for
dismissal would require information that would
be within the control of the defendant, and the
plaintiff would probably be unable to get that
information without overcoming the motion to
dismiss.

5. CONCLUSION

4.4 Freedom of Speech
Several of the US cases brought by private
plaintiffs against Google have been dismissed
on First Amendment grounds.26 The rationale has

Perhaps the plaintiff would be able to introduce some
evidence of lost consumers, but there are at least two
obstacles. First, the plaintiff does not have access to the
but-for world, and the defendant would surely that some
such losses would have been suffered in any case.
Second, the “degree of foreclosure” has usually been
interpreted as a portion of the entire market, and it is the
defendant that would have access to better information
about the scope of the entire market, particular if a
defendant-specific submarket were the relevant one.

Exclusion in the real world differs from
exclusion by algorithm. These brief comments
are intended to point out one critical
difference. Real-world conduct will often be

24

25

See supra text accompanying note 10.

See, e.g., S. Louis Martin v. Google, Inc., No. CGC-14539972 (Calif. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2014) (California
antitrust law), available at
26

http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Order.pdf; Search King, Inc.
v. Google Technology, Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M (W.D.
Okla. May 27, 2003) (case for tortious interference with
contractual
relations),
available
at
http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/files/2014/03/Search-King-Inc-v-GoogleTechnology-Inc.pdf. A similar case involving a creditrating agency is Jefferson County School District No. R1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Services, Inc. 175 F.3d 848 (10th
Cir. 1999).
27

Patterson, supra note 20, at 207-229.

28

Id. at 227-229.
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sufficiently transparent, in effect if not in
motive, to give plaintiffs that seek to challenge
it sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
plausibility of their cases. Algorithmic exclusion,
in contrast, will leave much evidence internal to
the computer systems that execute the
algorithms. Evidence of the nature of the
market and consumers, of the degree of market
foreclosure, and of the intent and effects of the
exclusion will all be in the possession of the
platform that uses the algorithm and thus will
be unavailable to plaintiffs. Without access to
that evidence, courts may dismiss the plaintiffs’
claims. That is, without evidence plaintiffs’
claims will be dismissed, but evidence will be
unavailable unless plaintiffs can avoid dismissal.
Catch-2229.

Catch-22 is presented in Joseph Heller, Catch-22
(1961):
29

“There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified
that a concern for one’s safety in the face of dangers that were real
and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy
and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as
he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more
missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he
didn’t, but if he were sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he
was crazy and didn’t have to, but if he didnt want to he was sane
and had to”.
Interestingly, and perhaps relevantly in the antitrust
context, one scholar makes the following comments
about the development of applications of Catch-22 in
Heller’s book:
“Earlier in the book, Catch-22 has a kind of bogus sophistication;
[later] its totally transparent part in the brutal operation of power
makes the point that those without power are its reified and
mechanistic puppets”.
Ian Gregson, Character and Satire in Postwar Fiction 38
(London: Continuum, 2006).
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